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Abstract in English 
We assess the quantitative impact of two reforms to corporation tax, which would eliminate the 
differential treatment of debt and equity: the allowance for corporate equity (ACE) and the 
comprehensive business income tax (CBIT). We investigate the impact of these reforms on 
various decision margins, using an applied general equilibrium model for the EU calibrated 
with recent empirical elasticities. The results suggest that, if governments adjust statutory 
corporate tax rates to balance their budget, profit shifting and discrete location render CBIT 
more attractive for most individual European countries. European coordination makes a joint 
ACE more, and a joint CBIT less, efficient. A combination of ACE and CBIT is always welfare 
improving. 
 
Key words: Corporate tax reform; European Union; Tax coordination; Computable General 
Equilibrium model; ACE; CBIT. 
 
JEL code: D58; H25 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Dit artikel onderzoekt de kwantitatieve effecten van twee hervormingen in de 
vennootschapsbelasting die de discriminatie tussen de financiering van eigen en vreemd 
vermogen wegneemt: de aftrek van eigen vermogen (ACE) en de alomvattende heffing op 
inkomen van ondernemingen (CBIT). We onderzoeken de invloed van deze hervormingen op 
diverse beslissingen van bedrijven met behulp van een toegepast algemeen evenwichtsmodel 
voor de EU. Het model is gekalibreerd op basis van recente empirische schattingen uit de 
literatuur. De resultaten laten zien dat, als overheden hun VPB-tarieven gebruiken om het 
overheidsbudget neutraal te maken na een hervorming, CBIT het meest aantrekkelijk is voor de 
meeste Europese landen. Dit is het geval vanwege gunstige effecten op winstallocatie en de 
vestiging van winstgevende bedrijven. Als Europa een gecoördineerd beleid kiest, dan is de 
ACE echter aantrekkelijker. Een combinatie van ACE en CBIT is altijd welvaartsverbeterend.  
 
Steekwoorden: Vennootschapsbelasting; Europese Unie; Belastingcoördinatie; Toegepast 
algemeen evenwichtsmodel; ACE; CBIT. 
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Summary 
The comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) and the allowance for corporate equity (ACE) 
have recently gained interest in European policy debates as a way of restructuring corporate tax 
systems. Indeed, a number of countries have experimented or actually implemented reforms in 
the direction of an ACE. Others have put limitations to the deductibility of interest, which goes 
in the direction of CBIT. This report explores the economic implications of ACE and CBIT 
reforms in two different ways. First, we theoretically analyse ACE and CBIT in an open-
economy framework capturing various behavioural responses. It sheds light on the key trade-
offs in designing such reforms. Second, we adopt an applied general equilibrium model for 
Europe to quantitatively assess the effects of ACE and CBIT in EU countries. The model 
encompasses several decision margins of firms, such as marginal investment decisions, their 
financial structure and the choice of multinational companies with respect to foreign direct 
investment and international profit shifting.  
The results suggest that ACE reforms in an individual country generally improve efficiency 
by removing the distortion between debt and equity finance and by reducing the cost of capital. 
As long as governments finance the ACE with higher lump-sum taxes to households, welfare in 
Europe expands by 0.6% of GDP. The ACE is particularly attractive in countries featuring high 
corporate tax rates and a broad tax base such as Germany, Italy and Spain. If ACE is 
accompanied by higher corporate tax rates to make up for the lost revenue, however, this erodes 
the corporate tax base through profit shifting and by adversely affecting the discrete location 
choice of multinationals. It illustrates the key trade-off for the ACE between a low tax on the 
normal return on capital and a low corporate tax rate on economic profit. If base erosion is 
strong, ACE tends to reduce welfare. This occurs in most Western European countries. Eastern 
European countries still benefit from ACE since they host a relatively small multinational 
sector. A joint European ACE is more likely to improve welfare since European cooperation 
eliminates fiscal spillovers within the EU, thus mitigating the erosion of the corporate tax base 
in response to higher corporate tax rates. 
CBIT in an individual country yields a similar effect as ACE on the financial structure of 
companies. However, by disallowing a deduction for interest, it increases the cost of capital, 
thereby exacerbating investment distortions. When the extra revenues raised by CBIT are used 
for higher transfers, welfare in the EU falls by 0.7% of GDP. This holds most notably in 
countries with high corporate tax rates. If CBIT is combined with lower corporate tax rates, 
however, the corporate tax base expands through several channels, especially via inward profit 
shifting and by improving the location advantage for profitable investments. If these channels 
are strong, CBIT is found to raise welfare in a typical European country by around 0.7% of 
GDP. Countries featuring high corporate tax rates, such as Germany and France, and countries 
that are relatively sensitive to profit shifting due to a large multinational sector, such as the 
Netherlands and the UK, gain most from a unilateral introduction of CBIT and lower corporate   8 
tax rates. Under a European CBIT, lower corporate tax rates exert smaller welfare gains since 
fiscal spillovers within Europe are mitigated. A European CBIT no longer raises welfare. 
A revenue-neutral combination of ACE and CBIT reforms is able to improve efficiency by 
alleviating distortions in the debt-equity choice of companies. A higher cost of capital on debt-
financed investment is now offset by a lower cost of capital on equity-financed investment. 
Aggregate investment slightly increases. Welfare is found to expand by 0.2% of GDP on 
account of a more efficient financial structure.  
The results suggest that a policy of corporate tax base broadening and rate reduction is likely 
to continue if European countries will not cooperate. CBIT-like reforms fit into this direction. 
This is consistent with recent trends in corporate tax policy in the EU. If Europe succeeds in 
cooperation, it might be able to relax fiscal spillovers and thus allow countries to design more 
efficient corporate tax systems with higher statutory rates. An ACE might then become a more 
serious alternative. 
   9 
1  Introduction
1 
The comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) and the allowance for corporate equity (ACE) 
have recently gained interest in policy debates as a way of restructuring corporate tax systems.  
Today’s systems allow a deduction of interest but not for equity. Such systems lead to excessive 
leverage, discrimination against risky or volatile businesses and create arbitrage opportunities 
that erode corporate tax bases. ACE and CBIT both aim to neutralise these distortionary effects 
of corporate taxes. 
Among the two, economists typically favour ACE. This grants equity holders a certain 
allowance equal to a notional risk-free return. This is attractive as it reduces the effective 
marginal tax rate to zero, implying that ACE is a tax on economic rent. As such, it does not 
distort decisions about the scale of investment, though even a tax on economic rent can affect 
discrete investment choices that depend on an effective average tax rate. A potential 
disadvantage of ACE is that its narrower tax base reduces corporate tax revenue and thus 
requires higher tax rates to yield the same revenue.  
By contrast, CBIT disallows the exemption of interest. It turns the corporate income tax into 
a broad-based tax on capital at the level of the firm. This raises the overall cost of capital so that 
investment declines. The broadening of the base under CBIT will raise corporate tax revenue 
and, if revenue is to be maintained, allows for a lower corporate tax rate. A lower rate will 
typically not be sufficient to prevent a rise in the effective marginal tax rate, which is why CBIT 
has not gained the same popularity as ACE.  
However, this paper argues that these traditional economic arguments need to be balanced 
by other factors created by changes in statutory tax rates. Specifically, multinational profit 
shifting – driven ultimately by differences in statutory rates – has become increasingly 
important due to internationalisation of businesses and the growing importance of intangible 
assets. In addition, evidence indicates that discrete location choices – driven by effective 
average tax rates – are relatively responsive to taxation. For these reasons, it is attractive for 
individual countries to broaden their tax base and cut the rate, as under CBIT, as opposed to 
narrowing the tax base and raising the rate, as under ACE.  
However, this depends on the nature of the reform. Cross country flows of profit and capital 
depends on relative differences in tax rates. If one country can cut its statutory rate relative to 
others, then it may gain an advantage with respect to both profit shifting and discrete location 
choices.  However, for a co-ordinated reform in the EU, the gains from lowering the statutory 
rate will be reduced if all countries reduce their rates. That is, European coordination mitigates 
international spillovers via statutory corporate tax rates and increases the relative importance of 
effective marginal tax rates. European coordination may thus render ACE more and CBIT less 
 
1 We are grateful to Albert van der Horst and Leon Bettendorf for research support and valuable comments and discussions. 
Marcel Gerard, an anonymous referee and participants at seminars in Oxford and Venice provided valuable comments.    10 
efficient as a system to tax corporate income. This implies that ACE may still be an attractive 
system for a coordinated reform in the EU as a whole. 
We use an applied general equilibrium model for Europe to quantitatively illustrate these 
effects of ACE and CBIT.
2 The model encompasses several decision margins of firms, such as 
marginal investment, financial structure, foreign direct investment, location choice by 
multinationals, and international profit shifting. Behavioural elasticities are calibrated on the 
basis of a careful review of the literature. Together with real world data on economic structures, 
the model allows us to identify for which European countries ACE and CBIT are welfare 
improving. Moreover, we quantify the difference between unilateral reforms undertaken by a 
single country, and a joint European reform. For reasonable parameter values, we show that if 
introduced by a single country and given a specific revenue requirement from the tax, it is 
plausible for most Western European countries that CBIT is preferred over ACE. As a joint 
European reform, however, ACE dominates CBIT. 
One qualification of our quantitative approach should be noted: we do not take account of 
the role of risk. In principle, this can be important in identifying the impact of a revenue-neutral 
introduction of ACE. Devereux (2009) argues that, in the presence of risk, the expected revenue 
from ACE, or a cash flow tax, would depend on the risk premium. If the risk premium is high 
relative to the risk-free rate of return, then the expected revenue-neutral rate required under an 
ACE would not be as high. The estimates in this paper of the required change in the statutory 
rate to maintain the same revenue with an ACE do not allow for this factor.   
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the two reforms in more detail, 
and reviews existing studies which aim to quantify their effects. Section 3 describes the applied 
general equilibrium model used in our analysis. The following sections show the results of the 
analysis. Section 4 considers the simulations. We start with the case in which each reform – 
ACE or CBIT – is introduced in a single country. In this case, the corporation tax rate is 
assumed to be unchanged – any revenue gains or losses from the reform are assumed to be 
covered by changes to lump-sum transfers. Then, we consider the case in which each reform is 
introduced in only one country, but instead assumes that the reform has to be revenue neutral, 
with the corporation tax rate being adjusted to ensure that the government’s budget is balanced. 
We also consider an alternative way of balancing the budget by combining ACE and CBIT 
reforms. That is, we allow part of the costs of debt and equity finance to be deductible from tax. 
Each type of finance is equally treated; the proportion of financing costs relieved is chosen to 
make the reform revenue neutral.  Finally, we consider the case in which the EU countries agree 
to cooperate, and all countries introduce the ACE or the CBIT. We assume in this case again 
that corporation tax rates are adjusted to balance the budget. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2 For a more extensive analysis and sensitivity analysis, see De Mooij and Devereux (2009).   11 
2  Studies on ACE and CBIT 
Most corporate tax systems in the world allow interest to be deductible as expenditure when 
calculating taxable profits. The normal return on equity is usually not deductible as a cost. 
Therefore, corporate tax systems discriminate against equity finance. To avoid distortions and 
arbitrage, governments have introduced anti-avoidance regulation and thin capitalization rules. 
A more comprehensive solution would be to implement an allowance for corporate equity 
(ACE) or a comprehensive business income tax (CBIT).  
2.1  Allowance for corporate equity 
The ACE system was originally proposed in 1991 by the Capital Taxes Committee of the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS, 1991, Devereux and Freeman, 1991). It was based on an earlier 
idea of Boadway and Bruce (1984), who suggested an allowance for corporate capital (ACC). 
Their idea was to abolish the deductibility of actual interest payments and to replace it by an 
allowance of the normal return, applied to the book value of the entire firm’s capital according 
to the tax accounts. The ACE is slightly different in that it maintains the current deductibility of 
actual interest payments. It adds to this a notional return on equity to be deductible against 
corporate profits. Since the tax advantage associated with the deduction for equity is certain, the 
appropriate notional return of the ACE is the risk-free nominal interest rate, e.g. the rate on 
government bonds (Bond and Devereux, 1995).  
The ACE is known to have several attractive features. First, it obtains neutrality between 
debt and equity finance. Thus the ACE makes thin capitalization rules redundant. Second, ACE 
is neutral with respect to marginal investment decisions. In fact, by allowing a deduction for 
both interest and the normal rate of return on equity, the ACE system leaves capital income 
untaxed and is a tax on economic rent. A third property of the ACE is that it offsets investment 
distortions induced by differences between economic depreciation and depreciation for tax 
purposes. Accelerated depreciation for tax purposes will reduce the book value of assets in the 
tax accounts, thereby also reducing the ACE in later years. This exactly offsets the benefits 
from earlier depreciation in present value terms. Indeed, the present value of the sum of the 
depreciation allowance and the ACE allowance is independent of the rate at which firms write 
down their assets in the tax accounts.  
While the ACE system is more neutral than current corporate tax systems to investment and 
its financial structure, the narrower tax base reduces corporate tax revenue. It requires higher 
corporate tax rates to balance the government budget.
3 The ACE would then shift the tax burden 
from the marginal return to capital towards economic rents. This implies that decisions as to the 
scale of investment would not be affected by the tax.  
 
3 Note that an ACE should not necessarily be financed by higher corporate tax rates. The economic effects can be markedly 
different under an alternative way of balancing the government budget.   12 
However, discrete choices are affected by the effective average tax rate, which is not zero under 
the ACE. An important example of a discrete choice is the decision of where to locate part of a 
multinational company (Devereux and Griffith, 1998). Further, higher tax rates under an ACE 
may be unattractive in light of international profit shifting. Multinational firms have a variety of 
options to shift profits across their affiliates through tax planning activities. These incentives are 
determined by differences in statutory tax rates.
4  
There is some experience with ACE-type reforms in Austria, Croatia, Italy, Brazil and 
Belgium (see Klemm, 2007 for an overview). Yet, empirical studies cannot give us clear-cut 
evidence on the economic implications of ACE reforms, either because of lack of data, or 
because the ACE was part of a multiple reform package, which makes it difficult to identify the 
impact of ACE alone. Simulation models have been used to numerically assess the economic 
consequences of the ACE in individual countries. Keuschnigg and Dietz (2007) use a dynamic 
computable general equilibrium model to assess the ACE as part of a broader reform package in 
the taxation of capital income in Switzerland. They derive household decisions from an 
overlapping generations framework with endogenous labour  supply and an endogenous 
portfolio composition of savings. On the firm side, the model distinguishes between 
domestically owned corporate and non-corporate firms, as well as domestic subsidiaries of 
home and foreign based multinational firms. Firms endogenously determine their debt share, 
dividend payout and investment behaviour. In the simulations, Keuschnigg and Dietz finance 
the ACE-part by an increase in the value-added tax by 1.5 percentage points. The first column 
in Table 2.1 shows their results. It shows that the reform reduces the cost of capital for Swiss 
firms by 1.5 percentage points. This raises investment by 7.8%, and also raises employment and 
GDP. The more neutral treatment of debt and equity causes a decline in the debt/asset ratio by 
3.8 percentage points. Welfare in their analysis is probably best reflected in the rise in private 
consumption by 1.4%.  
Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2007) also use a computable general equilibrium model for 
Germany called IfoMod to perform a similar experiment as Keuschnigg and Dietz. The model 
includes two countries and is based on an infinitely lived agent who works in either of two 
sectors: a corporate or non-corporate sector. The model describes the investment behaviour and 
financial behaviour of these firms. In the simulations, the cost of the ACE allowance is financed 
by a higher VAT rate. The second column of Table 2.1 reports their findings. The authors find 
that the ACE is rather costly and requires a 5.1 percentage point increase in the VAT rate to 
balance the budget for the government. The cost of capital falls by 6.3%, which causes an 
increase in investment by more than 20%. GDP expands by more than 9% in the long run.  
 
4 Profit taxes may also affect investment in the presence of capital-market imperfections by reducing net internal funds. 
Empirical evidence supports the impact of net internal funds on investments (see Hubbard, 1997, for an overview). However, 
this aspect of the tax is not included in the CORTAX model used here.   13 
2.2  Comprehensive business income tax 
The CBIT eliminates the favourable fiscal discrimination of debt financed investment by 
disallowing a deduction for interest payments. The CBIT was proposed by the US Treasury 
(1992). In that proposal, a distinction is made between so-called CBIT entities and non-CBIT 
entities. Most firms will be CBIT entities (only small firms will not) who are disallowed interest 
deductibility. This also applies to financial companies, including banks. To avoid double 
taxation of interest, the interest received by firms or banks from other CBIT entities is either 
exempt or credited. The interest that firms or banks receive from non-CBIT entities remains 
subject to tax, including interest from households and government bonds. Interest received from 
abroad will be subject to tax, although an exemption or credit could be applied if this interest 
comes from a CBIT entity, e.g. if other countries also introduce a CBIT.  
CBIT transforms the corporate income tax into a broad-based tax on capital. All capital 
income will thus be taxed at source.
5 A disadvantage is that it raises the cost of capital. Fewer 
investment projects will be profitable at the margin so that investment will decline. Yet, for a 
revenue-neutral reform, the broadening of the base allows for a lower corporate tax rate. This 
may attract mobile economic rents or paper profits of multinationals. The trade-off is therefore 
opposite from the ACE: CBIT shifts the tax burden away from rents towards marginal 
investment returns. On balance, the effect is ambiguous: the cost of capital on low-yielding 
investments financed by debt will rise, leading to lower investments. Highly profitable 
investments financed by equity will be taxed more lightly so that these investments will expand.  
There are no real-world experiments of actual CBIT regimes. However, countries have 
imposed reforms that limit the deductibility of interest in some way, usually through thin-
capitalisation rules. These rules imply that the interest is not deductible from profit if the debt-
equity ratio exceeds a certain threshold. Buettner et al. (2008) report that in 2005 approximately 
60% of the European countries had thin-capitalisation rules in place and that these rules were 
effective in reducing debt-equity ratios.   
Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2007) have also analysed the economic effects of a CBIT in 
Germany with the Infomod model. The third column of Table 2.1 shows that CBIT allows for a 
cut in the value-added tax rate by 4.3 percentage points. The model predicts an increase in the 
cost of capital by almost 10%, which reduces investment by a similar amount. GDP falls by 
more than 5%, inducing welfare to drop by 0.7% of GDP. 
 
5 In the US treasury proposal, CBIT is accompanied by an abolition of personal taxes on capital. We only consider the 
reform in the corporate tax.   14 
Table 2.1  Simulation outcomes from previous country studies on ACE and CBIT 










           
Country    Swiss ACE  German ACE  German CBIT   
           
Corporate tax rate  Level  23.2  38.3  38.3   
Value-added tax rate  ∆  1.5  5.1  − 4.3   
Cost of capital  ∆  − 1.5  n.a.  n.a.   
  %∆  n.a.  − 6.3  9.7   
Debt ratio  ∆  − 3.8  n.a.  n.a.   
Employment  %∆  0.4  1.7  − 1.4   
Capital stock  %∆  7.8  20.5  − 10.2   
GDP  %∆  2.6  9.1  − 5.3   
Private consumption  %∆  1.4  4.6  − 4.7   
Welfare (in % GDP)  ∆  n.a.  0.08  − 0.7   
    a We take the results from table 3 of their study, in particular, the difference between the fourth and third column.  
b We take the results from the first column of tables 3 and 4 of their study. 
 
2.3  Comparing ACE and CBIT 
Economists traditionally favour an ACE system as a means to eliminate both investment and 
financial distortions. CBIT has less appeal since it exacerbates marginal investment distortions. 
The outcomes from numerical CGE models confirm this, as Table 2.1 reveals. This view 
ignores, however, international distortions induced by high statutory corporate tax rates. Such 
distortions have gained more importance during recent decades in light of the 
internationalisation of businesses. Indeed, empirical studies on profit shifting and multinational 
location decisions suggest large international responses. In particular, international distortions 
render low effective marginal tax rates less important and low statutory tax rates more 
important for individual countries (see also Bond, 2000). This implies that CBIT-type reforms 
may enhance welfare more while ACE reforms may have lost some potential for welfare gains. 
The rest of this paper explores whether this is indeed plausible for realistic parameter values.   
2.4  Combining ACE and CBIT 
We also consider a combination of ACE and CBIT reforms. ACE gives full relief for the cost of 
debt and equity finance, while CBIT gives relief for neither. It is clearly possible to imagine a 
tax which gives partial, but equal, relief for debt and equity. We consider a case in which the 
reform introduces a partial allowance for equity, and reduces the relief for debt, so that the same 
proportion of the costs of equity and debt are relieved. The proportion is chosen to make the 
reform revenue neutral. Such a reform eliminates the distortions in the financing choice 
between debt and equity. The effect on the cost of capital lies between that of ACE and CBIT.    15 
3  The CORTAX model 
This paper uses the CORTAX model to quantify the trade-offs in ACE and CBIT reform in 
Europe. CORTAX is an applied general equilibrium model describing the 27 countries of the 
European Union, the US and Japan. It is designed to simulate the economic implications of 
unilateral and multilateral corporate tax policies. The structure of each country is the same and 
countries are linked via trade in goods and capital and via multinational firms.  
Table 3.1  Calibration of CORTAX, data 2007 






















               






               
Austria   25  37  8.9  46  − 0.4  0.2  − 0.1 
Bulgaria   10  40  2.8  18  − 0.3  0.3  0.0 
Cyprus   10  42  3.1  76  − 0.2  0.3  − 0.1 
Czech Republic   24  39  8.3  30  − 0.5  0.3  0.0 
Germany   36  36  12.4  48  − 0.5  0.2  − 0.2 
Denmark   25  46  4.9  75  − 0.2  0.2  − 0.2 
Spain   33  33  13.4  40  − 0.6  0.2  − 0.1 
Finland   26  40  7.4  65  − 0.3  0.2  − 0.1 
France   33  40  10.3  63  − 0.3  0.2  − 0.2 
United Kingdom   30  39  9.4  74  − 0.3  0.3  − 0.3 
Greece   25  41  6.9  8  − 0.5  0.2  0.0 
Hungary   16  35  5.8  40  − 0.4  0.3  − 0.1 
Ireland   13  36  4.3  153  − 0.3  0.3  − 0.1 
Italy   37  38  13.0  19  − 0.5  0.2  − 0.1 
Lithuania   18  50  2.1  12  − 0.1  0.3  0.0 
Latvia   15  46  2.6  14  − 0.2  0.3  0.0 
Netherlands   26  36  8.5  240  − 0.2  0.2  − 0.6 
Poland   19  37  6.8  17  − 0.5  0.3  0.0 
Portugal   27  40  7.7  35  − 0.3  0.3  − 0.1 
Romania   16  44  3.2  12  − 0.2  0.3  0.0 
Slovak Republic   19  44  4.5  28  − 0.3  0.2  0.0 
Slovenia   23  46  6.3  14  − 0.1  0.3  − 0.1 
Sweden   28  40  7.7  98  − 0.3  0.2  − 0.3 
Unweighted average  23  40  7.0  53  − 0.3  − 0.3  − 0.2 
   16 
We set shares to replicate aggregates from national accounts in 2005 and data on firm accounts 
in ORBIS, a comprehensive set of standardized balance sheet information, profit and loss 
accounts and ownership information for over 9 million companies, provided by Bureau van 
Dijk. Parameters are set so as to replicate empirical elasticities found in the economic literature. 
CORTAX is heavily inspired by the OECDTAX-model of Sørensen (2001; 2004). An earlier 
version was used for European tax policy analysis in Bettendorf et al. (2006, 2007) and Van der 
Horst et al. (2007). A detailed description of the structure and parameterisation of the model can 
be found in Bettendorf and Van der Horst (2008). This section presents the main features of 
CORTAX. Information on key parameters and elasticities is presented in Table 3.1. 
3.1  Households 
Following the overlapping generations model of Diamond, households live for two periods. One 
may interpret each period to cover 40 years. We express all variables in annual terms to 
facilitate the interpretation in terms of national accounts data. Behaviour within each 40-year 
period is assumed to be constant. Households make their decisions regarding work, 
consumption and saving by maximizing a life-time utility function subject to an intertemporal 
budget constraint. When young (i.e. the first period), households choose to allocate their time 
between leisure and work. When old (i.e. the second period) households do not work but only 
consume. Young households receive after-tax wage income and lump-sum transfers. This 
income at a young age is allocated over consumption and savings. Savings are invested in a mix 
of bonds and stocks, which are assumed to be imperfect substitutes and which yield different 
rates of return. In the second period, households are retired. Consumption at old age is financed 
by the assets saved from the first period plus an after-tax rate of return and by lump-sum 
transfers. Moreover, the older generation is assumed to own the fixed factor used by firms. 
Therefore, the old receive the economic rents.   
Household optimization yields expressions for labour supply, consumption, savings and the 
optimal asset portfolio. Asset returns are determined on world markets and we do not explore 
residence-based taxes on capital in this paper. Therefore, saving is not affected by the policies 
explored here. The most important distortion is related to the consumption/leisure choice. 
Labour supply behaviour in CORTAX is governed by the usual income and substitution effects. 
Most empirical studies suggest that substitution effects dominate income effects so that the 
uncompensated elasticity of labour supply is positive. In CORTAX, we set for all countries the 
utility parameters so that we obtain an uncompensated elasticity of labour supply of 0.19 on 
average (values differ slightly due to country variation in shares).   17 
3.2  Firms 
In CORTAX, one representative domestic firm and one representative multinational 
headquarter is located in each country. The multinational owns a subsidiary in each foreign 
country. With 29 countries in CORTAX, we thus have 30 different firms operating in each 
country, namely the representative domestic firm, the representative headquarter and 28 
subsidiaries that are owned by the headquarters in the other countries.  
Each firm maximises its value – equal to the net present value of all future cash flows – 
subject to the accumulation constraints and a production function. The production function 
features three primary factors: labour, capital and a fixed factor. Labour is immobile across 
borders and wages are determined on national labour markets. Capital is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile internationally so that the return to capital (after source taxes) is given for each 
country on the world capital market. The fixed factor in domestic firms is location-specific (e.g. 
land) and is supplied inelastically. The fixed factor in subsidiaries is firms-specific (e.g. a brand 
name or a patent) and supply in a country depends on taxes. The income from the fixed factor 
reflects an economic rent. 
In calibrating the model of the firm, capital and labour parameters are determined by 
national accounts data on labour- and capital income shares. The fixed factor is – somewhat 
arbitrarily – set at 2.5% of value-added in each country. This value ensures that CORTAX 
yields appropriate corporate tax-to-GDP ratios. Investment is determined by the cost of capital. 
The responsiveness of investment depends on the substitution elasticity between labour and 
capital. Most general equilibrium models adopt values between 0.5 and 1.0. We use a value of 
0.7. It corresponds to an elasticity of investment to the user cost of capital of − 0.9, which is 
consistent with empirical estimates (Hassett and Hubbard, 2002). 
Firms finance their investment by issuing bonds and by retaining earnings (issuing new 
shares is excluded in CORTAX). The optimal financial structure depends on the difference 
between the after-tax cost of debt and equity. Along the lines of the trade-off theory, we include 
a financial distress cost associated with high debt positions. The marginal cost of debt finance 
increases in the debt share. In CORTAX, the convexity of the financial distress cost determines 
the impact of corporate taxation on a firms’ financial policy. We set the parameters in this 
function so as to obtain a semi-elasticity of the debt share with respect to the corporate tax rate 
between 0.2 and 0.4, which is based on recent empirical studies (see Weichenrieder and 
Klautke, 2008). The convexity of the cost function implies that the semi-elasticity falls in the 
corporate tax rate.   18 
3.3  Multinationals 
In maximising the value of the firm, multinationals take the sum of its headquarter and all 
subsidiaries. Rents earned by subsidiaries accrue to the headquarter in the parent country, which 
is assumed to wholly own the subsidiary. The headquarters are assumed to be wholly owned by 
domestic households. In the calibration of CORTAX, the size of the fixed factor in each 
subsidiary is determined by data on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks. Given the 
fixed factor, multinationals decide how much capital and labour to employ in each foreign 
subsidiary. If a corporate tax raises the cost of capital in a country, this reduces the amount of 
investment the multinational is willing to invest in that subsidiary. Thus, inward FDI in a 
location is governed by the effective marginal tax rate. 
The fixed factor in foreign subsidiaries is firm-specific and responsive to taxes. The idea is 
that multinationals can move an entire profitable plant to another location in response to tax. 
Empirical evidence supports the importance of such discrete location decisions. For instance, 
studies using count data on investment typically report significant negative elasticities for the 
average tax burden. Moreover, effective average tax rates (EATRs) are found to exert a larger 
and more robust impact on FDI than effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) (see e.g. Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998; Devereux and Lockwood, 2006; De Mooij and Ederveen, 2008). As the 
EATR is a weighted average of the EMTR and the statutory tax rate (Devereux and Griffith, 
2003), statutory tax rates do play a significant role for investment. In CORTAX, we set the 
response of the fixed factor to the statutory tax rate so as to obtain a semi-elasticity of FDI to 
the EATR of − 6 on average in the EU. It corresponds to the outcomes of a recently updated 
meta analysis in De Mooij and Ederveen (2008). In the model, we assume that location choices 
are responsive to tax differences only within the EU, but not between the EU and other regions. 
CORTAX distinguishes two types of profit shifting: transfer price manipulation within the 
group of 29 countries and profit shifting to outside tax havens. First, foreign subsidiaries need 
intermediate inputs to produce output. These are supplied by the parent company. As there is 
only one homogeneous good in the model, the arms-length price for this intermediate input is 
equal to the market price of the numeraire good, i.e. equal to one. However, the parent company 
can charge a transfer price for intra-company deliveries that deviates from this arms-length 
price. In particular, a headquarter company has an incentive to set an artificially low (high) 
transfer price for supplies to subsidiaries in countries that feature a lower (higher) statutory 
corporate tax rate. In this way, the multinational is able to shift profits from high to low-tax 
countries, thereby reducing its overall tax liability. To ensure an interior solution, we specify a 
convex cost function to capture the costs associated with manipulated transfer pricing. Hence, 
profit shifting to countries with very low corporate tax rates becomes increasingly costly at the 
margin. The elasticity of transfer pricing with respect to the corporate tax rate is determined by 
the parameters in the cost function and is set to obtain a tax elasticity of transfer pricing of 
around − 1.4 on average over all countries. To compare this to the empirical evidence on profit   19 
shifting, we translate it into a semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base, which requires 
multiplying it with the share of intrafirm trade (which, in CORTAX, is proportional to bilateral 
FDI stocks). We thus obtain a mean value of the semi-elasticity of − 0.23, i.e. the corporate tax 
base shrinks by 2.3% due to profit shifting if the corporate tax rate is increased by 10%-points. 
This reasonably fits in the range of estimates found in the literature on transfer pricing, but is 
small in light of evidence on total profit shifting. The importance of FDI differs between 
countries (see Table A.1), which causes the semi-elasticity to differ as well. In particular, it is 
large in the Benelux, where FDI is relatively important, and small in the Central and Eastern 
European countries where multinationals are relatively unimportant. 
The second type of profit shifting in CORTAX reflects the presence of tax havens outside 
the OECD. Multinationals decide how much effort to put in shifting the profit tax base to tax 
havens by trading off a marginal effort cost (e.g. a cost to set up an extra tax haven subsidiary, 
deal with tax haven authorities and settle disputes) against the benefit of saving tax. The effort 
cost is convex in the tax differential. We set the parameters in the cost function in a way that we 
obtain a semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base of − ½, i.e. a 10%-point tax differential vis a 
vis the average tax haven reduces the corporate tax base by 5%. Together with transfer pricing 
within the 29 countries of CORTAX, the average semi-elasticity of the tax base via profit 
shifting thus equals − 0.73. This comes close to aggregate estimates of profit shifting reported 
in empirical studies. Indeed, De Mooij (2005) reviews these studies and reports an average 
semi-elasticity of  − 1.0. Note, however, that the variation in empirical estimates is large. 
3.4  Government 
Government behaviour in CORTAX is exogenous, Hence, the government does not optimize its 
policies and we simply modify tax rates exogenously. In performing simulations, we keep the 
government budget balanced, i.e. the government does not run a surplus or deficit after a 
reform. On the revenue-side of the government budget, we have indirect taxes on consumption 
and direct taxes on various sources of income: corporate income, labour income, dividends, 
capital gains and interest. On the expenditure side of the constraint, we find government 
consumption, interest payments on public debt and lump-sum transfers. We keep government 
consumption and public debt constant as a fraction of GDP. The calibration of corporate tax 
systems plays an important role for the outcomes of tax reforms. These systems are calibrated 
on tax data for 2005. In the baseline, corporate tax changes in 2006 and 2007 are simulated so 
that reforms are considered relative to the systems in 2007. The values of statutory corporate tax 
rates, the net present value of depreciation allowances and the EMTR are reported in Table 3.1.    20 
3.5  Equilibrium and welfare 
Equilibrium must hold on each market. On the goods market, a homogenous good is traded on a 
perfectly competitive world market. Thereby, countries cannot exert market power so that the 
terms of trade are fixed. On asset markets, bonds and equity of different origins are perfect 
substitutes and are freely traded on world markets so that returns are fixed for individual 
countries. Debt and equity are imperfect substitutes at the micro level, i.e. for firms and 
households. The current account equals the change in the net foreign asset position for each 
country (including rest of the world), due to Walras law. As labour is immobile internationally, 
wages are determined nationally on competitive labour markets.  
We compute the compensating variation to measure the welfare effects of policy changes. It 
is equal to the transfer that should be provided to households to maintain their utility at the pre-
reform level. A positive compensating variation implies a welfare loss. In presenting the 
welfare effects of reforms, we put a minus for the compensating variation so that a positive 
value denotes an increase in welfare. We express the welfare effect in terms of GDP.   21 
4  Simulating ACE and CBIT reforms 
4.1  ACE and CBIT with adjustment of lump-sum transfers 
We simulate ACE and CBIT reforms with CORTAX. To begin with, we assume that only one 
country undertakes the reform at a time. But we allow each country to undertake the reform in 
turn, and analyse the impact on that country. Our results show the average effect across 
countries of the series of unilateral reforms. Note that the effects for individual countries ignore 
any spillovers to other countries. The average effects should therefore not be interpreted as the 
EU-wide effects of a joint reform, which is analysed in Section 6. 
In this section, we also assume that the government balances its budget by an adjustment of 
lump-sum transfers. We do not present outcomes for Belgium, Luxembourg, Estonia and Malta 
which are outliers due to either a peculiar economic structure (Luxembourg due to its extreme 
FDI positions), or special corporate tax regimes (Belgium, Estonia and Malta). For the 
remaining 23 European countries:  
 
•  ACE is modelled as a deduction for the equity share of capital in the tax accounts. We apply the 
nominal interest rate to compute the tax deduction. ACE implies a narrowing of the corporate 
tax base which reduces corporate tax revenues. On average for the EU, the corporate tax-to-
GDP ratio drops from 2.7% to 1.4%.  
•  CBIT is modelled as an abolition of the interest deductibility. The interest deduction in 
CORTAX is determined as the product of total assets, the debt share and the nominal interest 
rate. CBIT raises corporate tax revenue by 1.9% of GDP on average. 
 
Table 4.1 summarises the economic effects of the ACE and CBIT reforms on average for the 23 
European countries (unweighted averages). Figure 4.1 shows country-variation for the welfare 
effects of the two reforms. 
Table 4.1  Economic effects of unilateral ACE and CBIT reforms, with lump-sum adjustment
a 
  ACE  CBIT   
       
Corporate tax revenue (ex-ante) (% GDP)  − 1.3  1.9   
Total tax revenue (ex-post) (% GDP)  − 0.3  0.6   
Debt share (∆%)  − 4.7  − 6.8   
Cost of capital (∆%)  − 0.5  0.7   
Wage (%)  2.3  − 3.1   
Capital (%)  6.3  − 8.5   
Employment (%)  0.8  − 1.3   
GDP (%)  2.3  − 3.4   
Welfare (∆% in GDP)  0.6  − 0.7   
        a Unweighted average for 23 countries. 
Source: CORTAX simulations
   22 
Figure 4.1  Welfare effects of unilateral ACE and CBIT reforms with lump-sum adjustment  
  (countries ranked according to corporate tax rate) 
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Country labels: ITA = Italy; DUE = Germany; FRA = France; ESP = Spain; GBR = United Kingdom; SWE = Sweden; PRT = 
Portugal; FIN = Finland; NLD = Netherlands; GRC = Greece; DNK = Denmark; AUT = Austria; CZE = Czech Republic; SVN 
= Slovenia; POL = Poland; LTU = Lithuania; ROM = Romania; HUN = Hungary; LVA = Latvia; IRL = Ireland; CYP = Cyprus; 
BGR = Bulgaria 
 
The first column of Table 4.1 shows the effects of ACE. It is determined by two effects. First, 
the ACE eliminates the tax-favoured status of debt over equity finance and reduces the debt 
share for firms. Table 4.1 shows that, on average, the debt share falls by 4.7%-points.
6 Second, 
ACE raises investment by 6.3% due to the reduction in the cost of capital. The expansion of 
investment raises the productivity of labour. Firms will therefore increase their labour demand. 
This requires higher wages to stimulate workers to supply more labour as the uncompensated 
elasticity of labour supply is positive. The expansion of investment and employment increase 
GDP by 2.3%. The welfare effects of an ACE are smaller than the GDP effects for two reasons. 
First, part of the additional production is due to more employment. This has a cost in terms of 
less leisure time, which is accounted for in the welfare effects. Second, the expansion of 
investment is due to capital imports from abroad. While this increases domestic production, it is 
accompanied by an decrease in the net foreign asset position. This raises the difference between 
GDP and gross national income. Overall, welfare expands by 0.6% of GDP.  
The effects of ACE on the cost of capital and investment differ across countries, depending 
on corporate tax rates and corporate tax bases. This shows up in different welfare effects in 
 
6 Under ACE, the financial distortion is reduced but not entirely eliminated. The reason is that the allowance applies to the 
book value of equity capital in the tax accounts. In contrast, interest deductibility applies to actual debt, not the share of 
capital in the tax accounts. Under CBIT, the financial distortion is abolished entirely.    23 
Figure 4.1. We see that the welfare gains of an ACE rise with the initial corporate tax rate, 
which serves as a proxy for the initial distortion of investment. The welfare gain of an ACE 
ranges from a low 0.3% for Bulgaria and Romania to more than 1% in Germany, Italy and 
Spain. 
The effects of CBIT are shown in the second column of Table 4.1. These effects are also 
driven by responses in the financial structure and investment. First, CBIT eliminates the tax 
advantage of debt over equity, thereby reducing the debt share by 6.8 percentage points on 
average. However, CBIT raises the cost of capital by 0.7 percentage points. This reduces 
investment by 8.5%. Lower investment reduces labour productivity and, therefore, wages. This 
discourages labour supply and reduces employment. The reduction in capital and labour cause a 
decline in GDP by 3.4%. On average, welfare falls by 0.7% of GDP. Figure 4.1 shows that this 
welfare loss of CBIT becomes larger with the initial corporate tax rate and ranges between − 
0.2% in Cyprus to − 1.9% in Italy. 
Overall, our simulations illustrate the traditional message from the literature: ACE is a 
welfare improving policy as it removes financial and investment distortions. The simulations 
reveal that the magnitude of this welfare gain differs substantially across countries. CBIT is 
found to raise the cost of capital and, therefore, exacerbate investment distortions. This causes 
an additional welfare loss.  
4.2  ACE and CBIT with adjustment of corporate tax rates 
This section considers ACE and CBIT reforms that are revenue-neutral within the corporate 
sphere. First, we consider full ACE and CBIT reforms where the government balances its 
budget by adjusting statutory corporate tax rates. Hence, we keep the tax burden on corporate 
income unchanged and modify only its structure. The rate is chosen to balance the government 
budget ex-ante, i.e. before behavioural effects are taken into account. If government revenues 
change ex-post due to behavioural effects (such as changes in investment or employment), we 
use consumption taxes to balance the budget.
7  
Second, we allow the government to balance the budget by giving only partial relief for the 
cost of finance, though treating debt and equity equally. On average, a combination of 2/3 of an 
ACE and 1/3 of a CBIT is both revenue neutral and neutral with respect to financial structure. 
That is, 2/3 of the cost of finance receive tax relief. 
The economic effects of these reforms are presented in Table 4.2. The figures shown are 
unweighted averages for the introduction of the reform in each of the 23 countries separately. 
Figure 4.2 shows the welfare effects of ACE and CBIT for individual countries. 
 
7 This procedure is necessary to obtain feasible solutions in CORTAX. We put a cap on the corporate tax rate of 55%, which 
is binding for Italy in case of ACE.   24 
Table 4.2  Effects of ACE and CBIT with corporate tax rate adjustment, and a combined ACE-
CBIT reform
a 
  ACE  CBIT  Combined 
       
Corporate tax rate (%∆)  17     − 11.0  0.0 
Debt share (%∆)  − 3.3  − 6.5  − 5.8 
Cost of capital (%∆)  − 0.3  0.0  − 0.1 
Wage (%)  0.6  1.0  0.3 
Capital (%)  3.9  0.4  0.7 
Employment (%)  0.2  0.3  0.0 
GDP (%)  0.8  1.1  0.3 
Welfare (%∆ in GDP)  − 0.2  0.7  0.2 





To obtain revenue-neutrality under an ACE, Table 4.2 shows that, on average in the 23 
European countries, a 17 percentage point tax rate increase is required. The higher tax rate does 
not affect marginal investment distortions because ACE turns the corporate tax into a non-
distortionary tax on economic rents. But it does affect welfare via profit shifting and discrete 
location. Governments thus face a trade-off when considering an ACE between the benefits of a 
lower cost of capital and costs associated with a higher corporate tax rate. The strength of 
increased transfer price manipulation within the OECD depends on the importance of 
multinationals in a country. The effect is relatively small in Central and Eastern European 
countries and relatively large in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. Also the effect on 
discrete location is proportional to the size of the multinational sector. The effect on profit 
shifting to tax havens depends on the initial corporate tax rate due to the convexity of the cost of 
profit shifting. On balance, a unilateral ACE reform is found to expand employment and GDP. 
However, despite this, on average in the EU, welfare declines, due to profit shifting which 
erodes the corporate tax base and requires higher consumption taxes to balance the government 
budget. This reduces consumption and hence welfare. Figure 4.2 shows that the negative 
welfare effect induced by higher tax rates dominates in most Western European countries. In 
Eastern European countries, however, the welfare gain associated with the lower cost of capital 
dominates so that ACE is still welfare improving.  
The second column of Table 4.2 shows that CBIT allows governments to reduce corporate 
tax rates by 11 percentage points. The lower tax rate mitigates the adverse economic effects of 
CBIT on investment relative to the case in the previous section, as the average increase in the 
cost of capital becomes smaller. In fact, investment no longer falls since the lower corporate tax 
rate attracts inward discrete investments. This raises marginal returns to capital and offsets the 
impact of the higher costs of capital on investment. GDP expands by 1.1% on average 
especially due to the inflow of firm-specific fixed factors. Welfare rises by 0.7% of GDP. The 
welfare gain is again to a large degree determined by the benefits from profit shifting. Figure   25 
5.1 shows that the welfare gains of CBIT are especially large in Western European countries 
where multinationals are important.  
Figure 4.2  Welfare effect of ACE and CBIT with corporate tax rate adjustment (countries ranked according to 
importance of multinationals) 
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The combined ACE – CBIT reform is presented in the last column of Table 4.2. It eliminates 
the discrimination between debt and equity and reduces the debt share by 3.8%-points. The 
effect on the cost of capital is small. Indeed, while ACE reduces the cost of capital on equity-
financed investment, CBIT does the opposite for debt-financed investment. The model 
simulations suggest that the impact on economic variables is small, but positive. Investment 
rises by 0.7%, while GDP expands by 0.3%. All countries experience a welfare gain, 
somewhere between 0.1 and 0.4% of GDP, with an average gain of 0.2%. This gain reflects the 
welfare gain associated with a smaller financial distortion. 
4.3  European-wide ACE and CBIT reform 
If countries jointly implemented ACE or CBIT, the economic implications would differ 
compared to a unilateral implementation. This is due to the international spillovers induced by 
changes in statutory corporate tax rates. If a single country changes its rate, spillovers to other 
countries can be sizable. However, under a joint European reform, they would be smaller. 
Hence, the scope of the reform matters. This section considers multilateral ACE and CBIT 
reforms in the European Union, and compares the welfare effects of a joint reform with the 
unilateral reform analysed in the previous section. The effects of the joint reform are presented 
in Table 4.3. The welfare effects for individual countries are presented in Figure 4.3.    26 
The effects of higher corporate tax rates on profit shifting and discrete location would be 
smaller if all European countries simultaneously increased their rates since profit shifting and 
discrete location choices depend on the differences between rates, rather than the level of these 
rates. Hence, whereas individual countries would suffer from profit shifting if they unilaterally 
increase their corporate income tax rate, this effect would be mitigated if other European 
countries did the same. Table 6.1 shows that a European-wide ACE would yield a welfare gain 
of 0.4% of GDP in the EU compared to an average loss of 0.2% under unilateral policy. Also 
the effects on investment and employment would be more favourable as individual countries 
would no longer suffer from a decline in discrete investments under a joint European ACE. 
Figure 4.3 reveals that welfare would increase in most countries, including those that would 
suffer a welfare loss in case of a unilateral introduction of ACE. These smaller international 
spillovers render the ACE more attractive from a welfare perspective when implemented 
jointly. European coordination thus allows governments to design more efficient corporate tax 
systems with a lower EMTR, more investment and higher tax rates.  
Table 4.3  Effects of joint European ACE and CBIT reforms with corporate tax rate adjustment
a 
  ACE  CBIT   
       
Corporate tax rate (%∆)  17.0  − 11.0   
Debt share (%∆)  − 3.3  − 6.5   
Cost of capital (%∆)  − 0.3  0.0   
Wage (%)  1.2  0.0   
Capital (%)  4.8  − 1.0   
Employment (%)  0.5  − 0.3   
GDP (%)  1.8  − 0.6   
Welfare (%∆ in GDP)  0.4  0.0   
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Figure 4.3  Welfare effects of European-wide ACE and CBIT reform, with corporate tax rate adjustment 
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For similar reasons, individual countries that would find it attractive to introduce CBIT and 
reduce corporate tax rates if implemented unilaterally, might no longer benefit from this policy 
if it were implemented jointly in the EU. Indeed, Table 4.3 shows that welfare would not 
increase, compared to a welfare gain of 0.7% under unilateral CBIT. Investment, employment 
and GDP would fall under a European CBIT. Figure 4.3 indicates that a number of countries 
would no longer benefit from a joint European CBIT, while they would gain from a unilateral 
introduction. The difference occurs because lower corporate tax rates would have negligible 
effects on profit shifting within Europe and on location choices if other countries pursued the 
same policy. This renders a reduction in corporate tax rates less beneficial. Indeed, by 
mitigating international spillovers of national policies, European cooperation makes it less 
urgent to cut statutory corporate tax rates. European coordination would therefore make a CBIT 
a less attractive way to neutralise financial distortions.   28   29 
5  Conclusion 
This study analyzes potential reforms in Europe in the direction of ACE and CBIT. We 
illustrate the key trade-offs in designing such reforms between, on the one hand, efficiency 
effects via distortions in investment and financial structures and, on the other hand, the welfare 
effects of changes in tax rates. An applied general equilibrium model for Europe is used to 
quantitatively assess the economic implications of ACE and CBIT in EU countries using  
plausible elasticities.  
ACE is found to improve efficiency by removing the distortion between debt and equity 
finance and by reducing the cost of capital. However, if it is accompanied by higher corporate 
tax rates, the corporate tax base would erode due to profit shifting and adverse effects on 
discrete location of profitable investment. In countries where these effects are relatively strong, 
we find that ACE reforms could be welfare-reducing, though most Eastern European countries 
would benefit from the introduction of an ACE due to a small multinational sector.  
Introducing a CBIT would improve welfare though smaller distortions in the financial 
structure of companies, though by disallowing the interest deduction the cost of capital would 
increase, exacerbating investment distortions. If CBIT were accompanied by lower corporate 
tax rates, welfare would rise in countries with a large multinational sector as lower rates 
generated a broadening of the tax base via inward profit shifting and by attracting discrete 
profitable investments. This is consistent with the way in which European countries have 
shaped their corporate tax policies during recent decades, with policies of base broadening and 
rate reduction, partly by limiting the deductibility of interest.  
A revenue-neutral combination of ACE and CBIT reforms would improve efficiency as it 
reduced distortions to debt-equity choices. Welfare would increase a little due to this more 
efficient financial structure.  
The simultaneous introduction of an ACE in Europe would improve welfare since the 
international cooperation would eliminate fiscal spillovers within the EU, which work primarily 
via statutory rates. In contrast, if the CBIT were introduced throughout Europe, the benefits 
would be reduced since the fiscal spillovers within Europe would be mitigated. Hence, if 
Europe coordinated policies, ACE-type reforms would be more attractive and CBIT type 
reforms less attractive.    30   31 
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